This story begins with the introduction of metacognition to large language models (LLMs). In the LLM days of yore (like a few months ago), we just saw them as things we could ask questions and get answers back. It was exciting. People wrote think pieces about the future of AI and all that jazz.
But then a few extra-curious folks (this is the paper that opened my eyes) realized that you could do something slightly different: instead of asking for an answer, we could ask for the reasoning that might lead to the answer.
Instead of “where do I buy comfortable shoes my size?”, we could inquire: “hey, I am going to give you a question, but don’t answer it. Instead, tell me how you would reason about arriving at the answer. Oh, and give me the list of steps that would lead to finding the answer. Here’s the question: where do I buy comfortable shoes my size?”
Do you sense the shift? It’s like an instant leveling up, the reshaping of the landscape. Instead of remaining hidden in the nethers of the model, the reasoning about the question is now out in the open. We can look at this reasoning and do what we would do with any reasoning that’s legible to us: examine it for inconsistencies and decide for ourselves if this reasoning and the steps supplied will indeed lead us toward the answer. Such legibility of reasoning is a powerful thing.
With reasoning becoming observable, we iterate to constrain and shape it. We could tell the LLM to only use specific actions of our choice as steps in the reasoning. We could also specify particular means of reasoning to use, like taking multiple perspectives or providing a collection of lenses to rely on.
To kick it up another notch, we could ask an LLM to reason about its own reasoning. We could ask it “Alright, you came up with these steps to answer this question. What do you think? Will these work? What’s missing?” As long as we request to provide the reasoning back, we are still in the metacognitive territory.
We could also give it the outcomes of some of the actions it suggested as part of the original reasoning and ask it to reason about these outcomes. We could specify that we tried one of the steps and it didn’t work. Or maybe that it worked, but made it impossible for us to go to the next step – and ask it to reason about that.
From the question-answering box, we’ve upleveled to the reasoning box.
All reasoning boxes I’ve noticed appear to have this common structure. A reasoning box has three inputs: context, problem, and framing. The output is the actual reasoning.
The context is the important information that we believe the box needs to have to reason. It could be the list of the tools we would like it to use for reasoning, the log of prior attempts at reasoning (aka memory), information produced by these previous attempts at reasoning, or any other significant stuff that helps the reasoning process.
The problem is the actual question or statement that we would like our box to reason about. It could be something like the shoe-shopper question above, or anything else we would want to reason about, from code to philosophical dilemmas.
The final input is the framing. The reasoning box needs rails on which to reason, and the framing provides these rails. This is currently the domain of prompt engineering, where we discern resonant cues in the massive epistemological tangle that is LLM that give to the reasoning box the perspective we’re looking for. It usually goes like “You are a friendly bot that …” or “Your task is to…”. Framing is sort of like a mind-seed for the reasoning box, defining the kind of reasoning output it will provide.
Given that most of the time we would want to examine the reasoning in some organized way, the framing usually also constrains the output to be easily parsed, be it a simple list, CSV, or JSON.
A reasoning box is certainly a neat device. But by itself, it’s just a fun little project. What makes reasoning boxes useful is connecting them to ground truth. Once we connect a reasoning box to a ground truth, we get the real sparkles. Ground truth gives us a way to build a feedback loop.
What is this ground truth? Well, it’s anything that can inform the reasoning box about the outcomes of its reasoning. For example, in our shoe example, a ground truth could be us informing the box of the successes or failures of actions the reasoning box supplied as part of its reasoning.
If we look at it as a device, a ground truth takes one input and produces one output. The input is the reasoning and the output is the outcomes of applying this reasoning. I am very careful not to call ground truth “the ground truth”, because what truths are significant may vary depending on the kinds of reasoning we seek.
For example, and as I implied earlier, a reasoning box itself is a perfectly acceptable ground truthing device. In other words, we could connect two reasoning boxes together, feeding one’s output into another’s context – and see what happens. That’s the basics of the structure behind AutoGPT.
Connecting a reasoning box to a real-life ground truth is what most AI Agents are. They are reasoning boxes whose reasoning is used by a ground truthing device to take actions, like searching the web or querying data sources – and then feeding the outcomes of these actions back into the reasoning boxes. The ground truth connection is what gives reasoning boxes agency.
And I wonder if there’s more to this story?
My intuition is that that the reasoning box and a ground truthing device are the two kinds of blocks we need to build what I call “socratic machines”: networks of reasoning boxes and ground truthing devices that are capable of independently producing self-consistent reasoning. That is, we can now build machines that can observe things around them, hypothesize, and despite all of the hallucinations that they may occasionally incur, arrive at well-reasoned conclusions about them.
The quality of these conclusions will depend very much on the type of ground truthing these machines have and the kind of framing they are equipped with. My guess is that socratic machines might even be able to detect ground truthing inconsistencies by reasoning about them, kind of like how our own minds are able to create the illusion of clear vision despite only receiving a bunch of semi-random blobs that our visual organs supply. And similarly, they might be able to discern, repair and enrich insufficient framings, similar to how our minds undergo vertical development.
This all sounds outlandish even to me, and I can already spot some asymptotes that this whole mess may bump into. However, it is already pretty clear that we are moving past the age of chatbots and into the age of reasoning boxes. Who knows, maybe the age of socratic machines is next to come?
3 thoughts on “Reasoning boxes”